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Since the end of the Cold War, cooperative security became 
a catchphrase term used generally to describe a more peaceful 
approach to security through increased international cooperation. 
The cooperative security model essentially embraced four concentric 
and mutually reinforcing “rings of security”: Individual Security, 
Collective Security, Collective Defense, and Promoting Stability.1 
In 1992, American strategists — Ashton Carter, William Perry, 
and John Steinbruner discussed cooperative security in terms of 
providing new avenues toward world peace, and argued, “Organizing 
principles like deterrence, nuclear stability, and containment 
embodied the aspirations of the cold war… Cooperative Security is 
the corresponding principle for international security in the post–
cold war era.”2 Two years later, in 1994, former Australian Foreign 
Minister Gareth Evans described cooperative security as tending “… 
to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather 
than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather 
than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism.”3
In the contemporary and evolving understanding of cooperative 
security, promotion of stability outside the boundaries of states is 
regarded as an integral component that constitutes the cooperative 
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security system. Cooperative Security can be 
described as a “strategic system,” as it does 
not easily fit the generic accepted definition 
of a “strategy” which has been described as 
“the integrated application of means to achieve 
desired ends.”4 The word “system” implies 
that the concept cannot be fully realized in 
abstract, and should be based on existing or 
newly-created, and resilient institutions.5 The 
starting point for cooperative security would 
be creation of a strong normative base.6 In 
the contemporary context, new age collective 
security can be inferred as an understanding/
commitment among groups of nations with 
commonality of interests and values to protect 
the security interests of individual members 
within their joint spheres of interest. This, to 
a large extent, applies to liberal democracies 
wherein respect for the rule of international law 
remains integral.7
Cooperative security, as a system appears 
proactive, whilst being prepared to engage 
in collective diplomatic, economic, and, if 
necessar y, militar y action in areas outside 
common space which may threaten the states’ 
own security and stability. Commenting on 
‘status quo’ as a concept, Hans Morgenthau 
had opined, “… policy of status quo aims at 
the maintenance of distribution of power as it 
exists at a particular moment in history.”8 As few 
nations become more revisionist, expansionist, 













cooperative security, i.e., to reduce the risk of 
war [or conflict] which are not directed towards 
a specific country or coalition of countries9 shall 
be sought after. In order to develop the spirit of 
a common future, and promotion of stability, the 
system of cooperative security should seek for 
democratic countries to cooperate mutually for 
regional peace and security. The future success 
of cooperative security will hinge inherently 
upon common systems, institutions, and values, 
which foster a sense of security based on global 
rules and commons.
More than five decades ago, in 1967, the 
Australian National University held a conference 
based on the theme, India, Japan, Australia: 
Par tners in Asia? The conference delegates 
thought ‘…the future would be determined by 
how China behaved, and how others behaved 
towards China…’ Moreover, concerns revolved 
around Washington’s actions in the region and 
securing lasting economic growth.10 Fifty years 
on, the notion of enhanced cooperation between 
Australia, India and Japan is right back, driven 
implicitly by the challenges that Beijing poses.11
Sixth ADMM-Plus Meeting, Bangkok, 
November 2019
The Indo-Pacific region is undergoing a 
dramatic period of flux and transformation 
bringing in its own set of opportunities and 







mechanisms for cooperation to manage the 
changes occurring in the region.12 All of this is 
to say that there are numerous challenges at 
a time of great transition in states’ economic 
activity, strategic weight and international 
ambitions. Crises and transnational issues 
don’t respect the boundaries of traditional 
groupings or stay neatly in a single region.13 
Therefore, over a period of time, smaller group 
diplomacy/‘minilateralism’ will matter more in 
the Indo-Pacific because every strategic issue 
that the region is confronted with, is different, 
and is likely to engage dif ferent countries in 
different combinations.14
In this backdrop, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers and 
their counterparts from Australia, China, India, 
Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia, 
and the United States (making it a total of 18) 
gathered at the 6th ASEAN Defense Ministers’ 
Meeting Plus in Bangkok on November 
18, 2019. The ASEAN Defense Minister’s 
Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) is the only official 
framework of Defense Ministers in the Asia-
Pacific Region. The meeting underscored 
advancing partnership for sustainable security 
as well as a commitment to ensuring peace and 
stability in the Asia-Pacific by strengthening 
defense and security cooperation. Reaffirming 
their commitment towards regional peace, 
security, and stability by respecting universally 
recognized principles of international law, the 
Ministers plegded to promote cooperation and 
interactions, reach out to potential partners as 
well as respond collectively and constructively to 
global developments and security issues based 









The Ministers highlighted the significance 
of the ADMM-Plus as a key component of a 
robust, ef fective, and open regional security 
arrangement that contributes to trust and 
confidence-building as well as practical defense 
and security cooperation between ASEAN 
Member States and Plus Countries in response 
to common security threats in the region, whilst 
upholding ASEAN centrality and unity.15 The 
Ministers recognized the progress of practical 
cooperation under ADMM-Plus Exper ts’ 
Working Groups (EWGs), namely Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief, Maritime 
Security, Military Medicine, Counterterrorism, 
Peacekeeping Operations, Humanitarian Mine 
Action and Cyber Security.
The overall dialogue and exercises within 
the framework of ADMM-Plus EWGs have 
contributed substantially to capacity-building 
and interoperability enhancement amongst 
ADMM-Plus countries, in order to address 
security challenges for the collective benefit of 
the region. The new Co-Chairs of the ADMM-
Plus EWGs for the 2020-2023 cycles have been 
chosen, beginning with the ASEAN Defense 
Senior Of ficials’ Meeting Plus in 2020 in 
Vietnam. The ADMM initiatives have been 
put in place for ensuring practical cooperation 
amongst ASEAN Member States to collectively 
prevent miscalculation and respond to regional 
security threats.16 The ADMM-Plus framework 
places special emphasis on adherence to 
inter national  law,  encouraging safe and 
professional military interaction, preventing 
armed conflict, and providing mechanisms for 






The ADMM-Plus framework also recognizes 
that security threats and challenges in the Asia-
Pacific are trans-boundary and are increasing 
in frequency and severity – thereby calling for 
increased regional integration and connectivity 
as well as technological advancement to counter 
non-traditional security threats. This calls 
for countries in the region to forge practical 
cooperation and find sustainable ways to prevent 
and address these common security threats.18 In 
this regard, the ADMM-Plus framework remains 
committed to ensuring peace and stability 
in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening 
defense and security cooperation. This includes 
resolving disputes peacefully in accordance with 
universally recognized principles of international 
law, including the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, and maintaining and 
respecting freedom of navigation and overflight 
as well as advancing partnership in order to 
effectively respond to regional security threats 
in a sustainable manner, particularly through 
the ADMM-Plus EWGs and ASEAN-led security 
mechanisms based on mutual trust, mutual 
respect and mutual benefits.19
During the meetings, India’s Defense 
Minister, Rajnath Singh also held bilateral 
meetings with Defense Minister of Japan Taro 
Kono and others counterparts at the sidelines. 
In their deliberations, Singh and Kono reviewed 
the entire gamut of bilateral defense relations 
and discussed ways to further improve ties. 
Singh’s meeting with Kono was his first with the 
latter. Both leaders held detailed discussions 
on adding further momentum to India-Japan 
defense cooperation and expressed satisfaction 
over the defense engagements and exercises 
between their respective Armed Forces.20 
Taro Kono, former foreign minister, took 





September 2019 Cabinet reshuffle. Although 
he has not been the vice minister of defense, 
Kono has served as an active member of the 
Liberal Democratic Party’s National Defense 
and Foreign Af fairs Committee since long. 
Well known for his proficiency in the English 
language, Kono’s role is crucial as the defense 
minister in handling relationships as Japan 
seeks to bolster and expand ties with major 
allies and partners including the US, Australia, 
India, France and others.
Indo-Japan Defense Engagement: An 
Overview
India’s posture and approach that remains 
critical to its strategic objectives highlights the 
growing convergence of political, economic 
and security interests with stakeholders in 
the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions. 
Co-opting Japan as a permanent member of 
the Malabar Trilateral Initiative and India’s 
accreditation of its Ambassador to a separate 
and dedicated diplomatic mission at the ASEAN 
are manifestations of Delhi’s intent. Moreover, 
India and Japan remain committed to strengthen 
the East Asia Summit (EAS) and make it a more 
dynamic proactive process and platform to 
discuss regional political, economic and security 
issues. New Delhi and Tokyo also are working 
towards convening the EAS Ambassadors’ 
meeting in Jakarta and establishment of the EAS 
Unit within the ASEAN Secretariat. Maritime 
cooperation and regional connectivity within the 
EAS framework need to be enhanced further. 
This only highlights the significance and vitality 
of regional architecture through ASEAN-led 
fora such as ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN 
Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus, Expanded 
ASEAN Maritime Forum and their coordination 








The momentum at which the Indo-Pacific 
has assumed focus in New Delhi’s strategic 
thinking is unmistakable, both characteristically 
and substantively. India’s growing regional 
standing has influenced its integration with 
key stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region. Re-
orientation of India’s strategic focus from a “Look 
East” to an “Act East” policy, finds manifestation 
in the ensuing approach, by and large, towards 
the Indo-Pacific. And Japan, surely, remains 
among the key frontal pivots of this focus. 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and 
Indian PM Narendra Modi have long been in 
agreement to secure stability in the Indo-Pacific 
region, which remains indispensable to Tokyo 
and New Delhi’s national security.
Corresponding with the “Act East” policy 
approach and course, the regular dispatch of 
warships, including frontline destroyers and 
stealth frigates on long overseas deployment 
to the Indian Ocean and South China Sea 
verify India’s renewed maritime intent.22 The 
noticeable presence of the Indian flag on 
these strategically vital points, reiterates that 
New Delhi is fully cognizant of the ongoing 
movements in its strategic backyard, being a 
major stakeholder. Given its 7,500 km coastline, 
1200 islands and 2.4 million sq km exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), India’s reorientation and 
demonstration of being a consistent security 
partner for the region highlights its maritime 
interests and stakes in the larger Indo-Pacific. 
Notably, India’s first Tri-Service Andaman and 
Nicobar Command in the southeast corner 
of the Bay lies just 90 miles (145 km) from 
Indonesia’s Aceh Province, bordering the 






It would only be apposite to cite the Indian 
Defense Ministry’s 2011-2012 Annual Report 
that stated, “As rising nations ... become 
more power ful ,  emerging r isks require 
greater attention ... India remains conscious 
and watchful of the implications of China’s 
military profile in the immediate and extended 
neighborhood.”23 Besides, in a public interaction 
during his 2014 Tokyo of ficial visit, Prime 
Minister Modi commented on the presence 
of 18th century ‘expansionist mindset’ among 
certain regional actors – that of encroaching 
upon other countries, intruding in others’ 
waters, and capturing territory. This was widely 
interpreted as an oblique reference to China’s 
recent and recurring actions in the East China 
Sea and South China Sea.
The September 2014 Tokyo Declaration 
acknowledged converging global interests and 
critical maritime inter-connections between 
India and Japan by means of its Special Strategic 
and Global Partnership. It was in this declaration 
that both sides attached special importance to 
the regularization of bilateral maritime exercises 
as well as Japan’s continued participation in 
the India-US Malabar series of naval exercises. 
While addressing the Indian Parliament in 
August 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had 
averred, “... a strong India is in the best interest 
of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best 
interest of India.” The role of India and Japan for 
stability, prosperity and engagement in the Indo-
Pacific region by means of the “Act East Policy,” 
and “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” shall 
further be consolidated through bilateral and 
multilateral security and defense cooperation 
mechanisms. The entry into force of the two 
Defense Framework Agreements concerning 
the Transfer of  Defense Equipment and 





for the Protection of Classif ied Militar y 
Information was considered a welcome move. 
Japan’s readiness to provide its state-of-the-art 
defense platforms shall become an important 
bilateral security benchmark.
Bilateral defense engagement needs to be 
expanded through greater two-way collaboration 
and technology cooperation, co-development 
and co-production, and expediting discussions 
for determining specific items through the Joint 
Working Group on Defense Equipment and 
Technology Cooperation.24 Former Japanese 
Vice-Minister of Defense, Masanori Nishi 
pointed out that Japanese Maritime Self-Defense 
Force (MSDF) deployment has significant 
reliance on Indian logistical support that would 
provide more opportunities for Japanese vessels 
to visit Indian ports during voyages across the 
Indian Ocean. Nishi opined that Japan could play 
an active role in stabilizing the Indian Ocean and 
reinforcing a rules-based order in the following 
areas:
1)  Engagement with key Bay of Bengal 
states such as Myanmar, Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka through investments in 
infrastructure and capability-building
2)  Support for emerging regional institutions 
in the Indian Ocean such as the Indian 
Ocean Rim Association and the Indian 
Ocean Naval Symposium
3)  Maritime capacity-building among Indian 
Ocean island states and other developing 
states in the Indian Ocean, with a focus on 
blue economy; and
4)  Enhanced role for the Japanese Coast 
Guard.25







in the November 2016 joint statement between 
Prime Ministers Abe and Modi that highlighted 
safeguarding global commons in the maritime, 
space and cyber domains. Tokyo and New 
Delhi remain committed to respecting freedom 
of navigation and over flight, and unimpeded 
lawful commerce, based on the principles of 
international law, as reflected notably in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), which establishes the 
international legal order of the seas and oceans. 
In this context, all par ties need to resolve 
disputes through peaceful means, without 
resorting to threat, or use of force, and exercise 
self-restraint in the conduct of activities, while 
avoiding unilateral actions that cause escalation 
of tensions.
Japan and India are in agreement regarding 
the ef fective implementation of the 2002 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea, and an early conclusion of 
the negotiations to establish a Code of Conduct 
in the South China Sea in accordance with 
universally recognized principles of international 
law. Featuring prominently in the Japan-India 
Joint Statement consistently is underscoring 
the UNCLOS, freedom of navigation and over 
flight and unimpeded lawful commerce in 
international waters. The strategic upheaval in 
the South China Sea caused by unilateral actions 
such as massive land reclamation of submerged 
reefs, and militarization of this converted land 
has notched up regional tensions. It also raises 
criticality of the sea lanes of communication that 
underpin vitality of seeking to ensure continuing 
stability in the Indo-Pacific.26
During the September 2017 India-Japan 







between Japan Ground Self Defense Force and 
the Indian Army were agreed upon, especially 
to develop counterterrorism as a key area of 
common interest. In the context of enhanced 
co-operation between the two ground forces, 
it was decided to explore a joint field exercise 
in the field of counterterrorism between the 
Indian Army and the JGSDF in 2018. In the 
maritime realm, the success of Japan-India-
US Trilateral Maritime Exercise Malabar 2017 
held in July was welcomed and Japan expressed 
its intention to have state-of-the-art Japanese 
assets including P-1 to par ticipate in the 
Malabar 2018. The two sides also considered 
inclusion of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
training to expand cooperation and pursue 
exchanges and training by ASW aviation units 
such as P-3C. Japan proposed inviting the Indian 
Navy to mine-countermeasures training held 
by the JMSDF.27 The two countries agreed to 
encourage equipment collaboration including 
defense and dual-use technologies and identified 
specific areas of collaboration in the field of 
defense equipment and technology cooperation, 
including commencing technical discussions for 
research collaboration in the areas of unmanned 
ground vehicles and robotics.28
With the “Indo-Pacific Region” featuring 
prominently in the very title of the 2025 joint 
vision statement between India and Japan, 
the writing on the wall is apparent. A vital 
demonstration of India’s growing maritime focus 
extending beyond the Indian Ocean comes with 
Japan’s participation in the trilateral maritime 
exercise [Malabar] between India, US and Japan. 
The bilateral Indo-US Malabar naval maneuvers 
got a boost in 2014, after being upgraded to 
a trilateral initiative, this time including the 





29　RoryMedcalf, “Theevolvingsecurityorder intheIndo-PacificProfessor,” inBrewster,ed.,n.25;alsosee,Rory
Medcalf,‘TheIndo-Pacific:What’sinaName?’TheAmericanInterest,vol.9,no.2,Nov/Dec2013,pp.58-66.
has involved the navies of India, and the United 
States, along with Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense 
Forces. The trilateral exercises have witnessed 
greater inter-operability and integration between 
the three navies. Common political values, 
principles, democratic systems and convergence 
on regional and world views, carries a political 
message that seeks to convey India, US and 
Japan’s orientation towards securing the future 
of maritime Indo-Pacific.
Fulf i l l ing Cooperative  Security  in 
Tangible Terms
Given the concept of a broader Asia that 
is fast transcending geographical boundaries 
and lines, the emerging proximities render 
the prospects for cooperative regional security 
mechanisms, more deliverable than ever 
before. The notion of the greater Indo-Pacific 
has eclipsed the spheres of influence limited to 
the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China 
Sea, and the Western Pacific. In this reference, 
numerous policy statements coming from Japan 
have indicated that security issues in the Indian 
Ocean, Pacific Ocean, South China Sea, and East 
China Sea cannot be treated separately, or, as 
stand-alone issues alone. At its heart, a strategic 
system can be understood as a set of geopolitical 
power relationships among nations where major 
changes in one part of the system affect what 
happens in the other parts.29 The contemporary 
Indo-Pacific means recognizing the accelerating 
economic and security connections between the 
Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean region 
in creating a single strategic system. Regional 
players will be pushed to make prudent choices, 
whilst pursuing a sovereign foreign policy path 
that best suits their respective national security 





on regional liberal democracies that have 
perennially demonstrated respect for the rule 
of international law, norms, and agreements 
and showcase their strategic sagacity in the 
emerging scenario developing in the Indo-
Pacific.
India’s active engagement in the region 
within the ambit of its “Act East” policy initiative 
compliments Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-
Pacific Strategy.” Both these policy initiatives 
seek to nurture an open and transparent Indo-
Pacific maritime zone as par t of a broader 
Asia. This concept of a broader Asia is fast 
transcending geographical boundaries, with the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans’ mergence becoming 
far more pronounced and evident. These 
emerging proximities render the prospects 
for cooperative regional security mechanisms, 
more deliverable than ever before. India and 
Japan depict strong and shared essential 
freedoms and democratic values. Given the 
post-war identity as a state unconstrained by 
great-power relationships, India’s broader 
approach resonates and dovetails neatly with the 
omnidirectional pragmatism30 of the combined 
leadership of Abe and Modi.
Symbol iz ing  acknowledgment  o f  the 
economic and strategic  dependence on 
developments across a much wider maritime 
region, the Indo-Pacific prioritizes allocation of 
resources, security partners, membership and 
agendas of regional diplomatic and security 
institutions.31 This also suggests that the 
region will remain central in underscoring that 
30　JohnNilsson-Wright, “CreativeMinilateralisminaChangingAsia:OpportunitiesforSecurityConvergenceand









the histor y, geo-economics, geopolitics and 
strategic cultures amongst its major players 
shall continue to represent a fundamental clash 
of interests, thereby creating major barriers in 
their co-existence.32
The Indian Ocean also doubles up as a 
geopolitical and geo-economic ner ve center 
that remains critical to the regional construct, 
and its primacy. To a large extent, the Indian 
Ocean has significantly replaced the Atlantic 
as the world’s busiest and strategically most 
significant trade corridor.33 Consequently, major 
East Asian economies have acute dependence 
on oil imports across the Indian Ocean from 
the Middle East and Africa. The region is often 
labeled as the artery that carries resources to 
fuel the growth of regional economies. However, 
on the flip side, dependence of this nature can 
become a strategic vulnerability that could well 
influence regional par tnership-building and 
diplomatic relations.
Investments in ports across various locations 
in the Indo-Pacific stretching from Southeast 
Asia to the Indian Ocean Region have critical 
strategic ramifications that shall likely shuffle 
security alignments regionally. All these 
coupled with pure military strategies such as 
anti-access/area-denial capabilities, long-range 
precision strikes, and surface and undersea 
operations, shall likely render tensions across 
the Indo-Pacific. The management of leveraging 
growing economic and military power to assert 
sovereignty claims with repeated attempts at 







below the threshold of actual conflict, and a 
bid to create a new/fresh status quo situation, 
be it over features in the East China Sea, South 
China Sea, or over the Himalayan borderlands 
is a trend that holds dangerous portends. This 
geo-strategic graph of existential realities across 
the Indo-Pacific calls for enhanced security 
cooperation between India and Japan. Ensuring 
that dialogue par ticipation will remain the 
lynchpin for mapping out a shared vision for a 
futuristic Indo-Pacific strategy, the two nations 
trilateral need to work together to build the 
politico-economic capacity of regional states 
in order to render them capable of retaining 
and exercising their autonomy, defend their 
interests and identify common regional security 
challenges that straddle a geographic space 
extending from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific 
Ocean, and incorporate risks in South, Southeast 
and Northeast Asia.
Cooperative security shall only be realized 
in tangible terms when nations develop a 
sense of a common future, based upon shared 
political systems, forms of representation 
and governance, institutions and values that 
foster a sense of a security based on global 
commons and rules. Regular militar y and 
political dialogues, confidence-building and 
deterrence-enhancing regional exercises are 
the foundation in offsetting traditional security 
threats and challenges. Maritime security and 
stability in the Indo-Pacific will become more 
effective with converging themes in the realms 
of maritime security and cooperation. These will 
be the benchmark in identifying potential and 
common challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Besides, 
it is vital to analyze gaps in the corresponding 
domestic and regional policy frameworks. 
Growing symmetry in defense cooperation will 
help creating stronger capabilities to deal with 
common maritime threats and challenges in the 
Indo-Pacific region through enhanced disaster 
response and mitigation capacities. And finally, 
exploring and emphasizing the potential arenas 
of maritime stability and security between India 
and Japan amid their respective triangular 
equations, i.e., India–Japan–US, and Japan–
Australia–India will be the major regional 
equations that shall determine the balance of 
power and future roadmap of Indo-Pacific’s 
security and stability.
